We use the entanglement sampling techniques developed by Dupuis, Fawzi and Wehner [1] to find a lower bound on the entanglement needed by a coalition of cheaters attacking the quantum position verification protocol using the four BB84 states [2, 3] (QPV BB84 ) in the scenario where the cheaters have no access to a quantum channel but share a (possibly mixed) entangled state Φ. For a protocol using n qubits, a necessary condition for cheating is that the max-relative entropy of entanglement Emax(Φ) ≥ n − O(log n). This improves previously known best lower bound by a factor ∼ 4, and it is essentially tight, since it is vulnerable to a teleportation based attack using n − O(1) ebits of entanglement.
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The very first (classical) position verification (PV) protocols have been distance bounding protocols, introduced in 1993 [4] to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks. Based on the speedlimit c on information propagation imposed by special relativity, they can only work when the prover P and the verifier V are close, and are useless against nearby malicious adversaries M, i.e. when distance(M, V) ≤ distance(P, V) [5] . PV protocols by a coalition of distant verifiers {V i } are therefore needed in such situation, as they allow to build localized authentication protocol, but also many other cryptographic applications, like key distribution at a specific place [6] . However, Chandran et al. have shown in 2009 [6] that no classical PV protocol can be computationally secure against a coalition {M i } of malicious provers. They only found a protocol secure in the bounded retrieval model.
Quantum position verification (QPV) protocols appeared the next year in the scientific literature, with publications of three independent teams [2, 3, [7] [8] [9] [10] . Even in the quantum case, unconditional security is unattainable [3] , and a universal attack using an exponential amount of entanglement as been found by Beigi and König [11] . To guarantee the security of a QPV protocol one either need a computational hypothesis [12] or a bound on the quantum entanglement shared between the cheaters [3, 11, 13, 14] .
The present work is in the latter framework, where the cheating coalition {M i } only has access to a limited amount of entanglement. Despite the exponential universal attack [11] , all lower bounds found so far have been linear [11, 14] or sublinear [3, 13] . To our knowledge, the protocol showing the best security in this framework is the protocol using mutually unbiased bases QPV MUBs proposed by Beigi and König in [11] . A n-qubits implementation of QPV MUBs is secure against adversary holding less that n/2 ebits. However, QPV MUBs needs the coherent manipulation of n qubits and is therefore impossible to implement with present day technologies.
QPV BB84 , introduced in [2, 3] and defined below, is experimentally much simpler since it essentially uses quantum key distribution components [15, 16] , and Tomamichel et al. [14] have proved its security against adversary holding less than − log 2 (cos 2 (π/8)) · n 0.22845 · n ebits of entanglement. We improve this bound to n − O(log n) ebits. Since a teleportation-based explicit attack using n − O(1) ebits is known [8, 13] , this bound is tight.
We start this letter by giving some useful properties of the min-entropy H min and the max-relative entropy of entanglement E max , a related entanglement monotone. Since our security proof is based on an adaptation of the entanglement sampling based security proof [1] of weak string erasure (WSE) in the noisy storage model (NSM), we then describe this protocol. We then show its security the noisy entanglement model (NEM) and use it to show the security of QPV BB84 .
In the following S(A) is the set of quantum states of the system A.
Definition 1 (min-entropy). Let ∈ S(AB) be a bipartite state. The conditional min-entropy H min (A|B) is
The following property shows the conditional min-entropy of a classical-quantum (cq) state is essentially the logarithm of the probability to guess the classical part from the quantum part.
Property 2. [17, theorem 1] Let ∈ S(XB) be a cq-state, i.e. a state of the form = x p x |x x| ⊗ τ x with τ x ∈ S(B)∀x. Then,
where p guess (X|B) ) is the maximal probability of guessing the value of X from an optimal measurement on B.
The max-relative entropy of entanglement has been introduced by Datta [18] as an entanglement monotone closely related to H min .
Definition 3 (max-relative entropy of entanglement). Let ∈ S(AB) be a bipartite state. Its max-relative entropy of entanglement is noted E max ( ) A;B or E max (A; B) and is
where D is the set of separable states of S(AB).
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Property 4 (monotony of E max ). [18, theorem 1] The maxrelative entropy of entanglement E max is an entanglement monotone, i.e. it can only decrease under local operations and classical communications (LOCC). More formally, let Λ be completely positive trace preserving (CPTP) map S(AB) → S(A B ) which can be achieved through LOCCs.
In order to establish the theorem 6 linking E max and H min , we will need the following lemma :
Lemma 5. For any separable state σ ∈ D(A:B), there exists a state τ ∈ S(B) such that σ ≤ I ⊗ τ .
Theorem 6. For any bipartite state ∈ S(AB),
Proof. For any separable state σ ∈ D(A : B), there exists a state τ ∈ S(B) such that
The definition of −H min as lower bound (definition 1) then implies H min (A|B) ≤ −E max (A; B) .
Now that we have the relevant properties of H min and E max , we study the weak string erasure (WSE) protocol. It was introduced, together with the noisy storage model (NSM) by König et al. [19] to build secure bipartite protocols. The NSM is based on a technological limit imposed on quantum memories : after a delay ∆t, the quantum state they can hold decoheres and becomes noisy. In this model, a protocol is split in two phases. A bipartite protocol involving the traditionally named Alice (A) and Bob (B) can therefore be seen as a quadripartite protocol between two coalitions : it first involves early-Alice (A 1 ) and early-Bob (B 1 ), and then, after ∆t, later-Alice (A 2 ) and later-Bob (B 2 ). A noisy quantum memory held by Bob is then modeled by a noisy quantum channel F :
The WSE protocol proposed in [19] can be described as follows, for honest Alice(s) and Bob(s):
1. A 1 choses uniformly at random X n = {x i } i and Θ n = {ϑ i } i , two bit strings of length n.
2. B 1 choses uniformly at randomΘ n = {θ i } i , a bit string of length n.
3. A 1 sends to B 1 the quantum state iĤ ϑi |x i , wherê H is the Hadamard operator and {|0 , |1 } the computational basis of a qubit. It is the BB84 encoding of the string X n in the basis Θ n .
4. B 1 measures the qubits in the basesΘ n , and gets the stringX n .
5. Both parties wait the time ∆t. The classical memories of Alice and Bob corresponds to classical channels allowing A 1 to send {X n , Θ n } to A 2 and B 1 to send
We are interested here by the correctness of the protocol, but only by its security against a dishonest Bob.
Definition 7.
A WSE protocol is λ-secure against Bob if the probability for B 2 to correctly guess the string X n is smaller than 2 −nλ . More formally, let C(A 2 , B 2 ) be the set of all possible states σ A2,B2 which can be obtained at the end of the protocol if Alice follows it but Bob is dishonest. The protocol is secure for Alice if, ∀σ ∈ C(A 2 , B 2 ),
Instead of the λ-security, which ensures exponential security with n as long as λ > 0, one can also be interested in the ε-security for a fixed n : Definition 8. A protocol is ε-secure iff, for any possible dishonest strategy, the probability p cheat for a dishonest adversary to win is p cheat < ε.
Lemma 9. For a protocol like WSE or QPV BB84 , where the goal of the cheater is to guess a classical string X n , λ-security and ε-security are equivalent notions when
Proof. This follows directly from the definitions and property 2.
In the NSM model, a dishonest Bob changes the above protocol in the following way:
4. B 1 performs a generalized measurement on the qubits, obtaining a joint cq-system CQ 1 .
5. During the ∆t wait, B 1 stores this state in his memory. While the classical memory is perfect, the quantum memory is described by the noisy channel F, and B 2 obtains CQ 2 = (I ⊗ F)(CQ 1 ).
7. At the final step, the global quantum state is σ ∈ S(X n Θ n CQ 2 ), where A 2 holds the classical information X n and B 2 has access to the classical information Θ n C, as well as to the quantum information Q 2 . B 2 tries to guess X n from Θ n CQ 2 and the security of the protocol is measured by H min (X n |Θ n CQ 2 ) σ .
Theorem 10. ([1, theorem 14] ) Let Bob storage device F have a maximal fidelity, as defined in [1] , upper bounded by η. The WSE protocol defined above is λ-secure for
where γ is the function defined by
is the binary entropy function.
We defer the reader to [1] for the proof of this theorem. We will now reformulate it in a slightly different security model, the noisy entanglement model (NEM).
In the NEM, A 1 , A 2 , B 1 and B 2 are actually four different persons, localized at different places and connected with (unlimited) classical channels A 1 → A 2 and B 1 → B 2 . The protocol WSE is the same as described above, except that there is no specific ∆t at the step 5. B 1 and B 2 also share a (possibly mixed) entangled state Φ Q1,Q2 instead of a quantum channel F. The two models are obviously related, since one can create a state Φ by transmitting it through F, and one can create a channel F through teleportation, using Φ and the unlimited quantum channel.
We now adapt theorem 10 to NEM, exactly following Dupuis et al.'s proof [1] until their corollary 11 and slightly changing it after. As usual, we study the equivalent entangled protocol, where A 1 prepares a maximally entangled state |Φ + ⊗n AA , sends the A n half to B 1 and gives the A n half to B 2 . A 2 finds the string X n by measuring A n in the basis Θ n .
Lemma 11. [1, corollary 11] With the notations above, and γ defined in theorem 10, we have
We can now show the security of WSE in NEM :
Theorem 12. Let the dishonest Bobs share a (possibly mixed) entangled state Φ ∈ S(B 1 , B 2 ). In the NEM, the WSE protocol defined above is λ-secure if
Proof. We will look at the entanglement between B 2 and the other partners A 1 A 2 B 1 . The only entanglement which existing at the beginning of the protocol comes from Φ. Then all the operation specified by the protocol, as well as the ones allowed in the NEM, are LOCCs according to the B 2 ; A 1 A 2 B 1 split. We have therefore
Applying the monotonously increasing function γ leads us to
Lemma 11 then gives
which with some reordering and the definition 7 of λ concludes the proof.
where s := 1 − 2 log 2 ε and e is the basis of the natural logarithm.
Proof. According to theorem 12, the protocol is λ-secure for
s n applying g = γ −1 to both sides leads to
which gives the first inequality of the theorem. A straightforward study of the binary entropy functions shows that nh s n ≤ s log 2 n − s log 2 s e . Substituting this expression in the above equation concludes the proof.
We have now all the elements to prove the security of a QPV protocol. For the sake of simplicity, we limit ourselves to the unidimensional case. In this case a QPV protocol involves two verifiers {V 1 , V 2 } and a prover P between them. The QPV BB84 protocol [3] can be described as follows 1. V 1 and V 2 privately chose the strings X n and Θ n .
2. V 1 sends to P the quantum state iĤ ϑi |x i .
3. V 2 sends Θ n to P.
4. P receives the messages of {V 1 , V 2 } simultaneously.
He measures the qubits in the base Θ n and obtains X n = X n . He immediately broadcastsX n to {V 1 , V 2 }.
5. {V 1 , V 2 } accept P's position iffX n = X n and if they receive this information on time
The timing such that P has to at the right place to receive both the qubits and Θ n , and broadcast the measurement result to on time. We refer the reader to [3] for a precise definition of the timing and the correctness condition, as we are mainly concerned by the cheating strategies.
We now study the security of this protocol against a coalition of two malicious cheaters {M 1 , M 2 }, M 1 (resp. M 2 ) being closer to V 1 (resp. V 2 ) than P is supposed to be. The timing constraints allows them a single round of classical communications. In the NEM they have access to no quantum communications, except an initially shared bipartite state Φ ∈ S(M 1 , M 2 ). Note that an access to a quantum information channel of finite entanglement cost [20] can be brought in this model trough the corresponding state Φ. The possible action of the cheaters are:
1. M 1 performs a generalized measurement on the qubits sent by V 1 and his half M 1 of the state Φ. He gets a classical quantum system C 1 Q 1 and sends C 1 to M 2 2. Depending on Θ n , M 2 performs a generalized measurement on his half M 2 of the state Φ. He obtains a C 2 Q 2 and sends C 2 to M 1 3. Receiving C i±1 , M i extracts his best guess X n i from C 1 C 2 Q i and sends it to V i This looks like an attack on WSE in the NEM, where {V i } i = {A i } i and {M i } i = {B i } i , with the supplementary requirement that M 1 = B 1 has also to output X n . In particular, it means that any attack on QPV BB84 leads to an attack on QPV BB84 in NEM, leading us to our main result : Theorem 14. QPV BB84 is ε-secure if the state Φ shared by M 1 and M 2 verifies
where s := 1 − 2 log 2 ε.
Proof. Corollary 13 ensures that WSE is ε-secure in the NEM against adversaries using Φ as resource. We will now prove by contradiction that QPV BB84 is also ε-secure.
Let us suppose it is not the case: M 1 and M 2 have a cheating strategy winning in QPV BB84 with probability P QPV cheat > ε. They can use this strategy as B 1 and B 2 in a WSE protocol, without the M 2 → M 1 communication and the final broadcasts of X n i , and using X n 2 as guess for X n . Their probability to cheat WSE is P WSE cheat = P (X n 2 = X n ) ≥ P QPV cheat > ε: WSE is not ε-secure, which is contradictory with corollary 13.
Therefore, QPV BB84 is ε-secure.
We have shown the security of the practical protocol QPV BB84 in one dimension against a coalition of cheaters sharing an entangled state of max-relative entropy of entanglement E max (Φ) ≤ n − O(log n). This bound is the best known to date for a QPV protocol and is essentially tight for QPV BB84 , since an attack using n−O(1) ebits is known [8, 13] . While this method probably generalizes to the multidimensional case using tools from [12] , as well as to other protocols, like QPV MUBs [11] and non-Pauli variants of QPV BB84 [8, 13] , it will not approach the exponential upper bound of these protocols. This method is also useless when M 1 and M 2 have access to an unlimited quantum channel (but did not use it for some reason to share entanglement before the protocol starts), while the bound of [14] works in this case.
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